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Abstract 
This article delineates generic causes to internal conflict and proposes a 
coalition-forming methodology to allow for power sharing as one avenue of conflict 
resolution.  A suitable framework to study causes to in ernal conflict should, at least, 
provide for big bad men versus people under pressur, recent versus historic events 
and an internal versus an external emphasis that may be employed to understand the 
rationale for internal conflict. As long as aggrieved parties are not allowed to 
address their grievances adequately, political conflict will emerge and, if not 
addressed timely, such conflict may lead to civil war. A conflict resolution 
mechanism based on the Shapley value is proposed to deal with internal conflict. 
The allocation of delegates, derived so that all parties have a say commensurate with 
their support bases, should allow for formal consensus to take place more readily 
than in cases where a particular party’s representatio  in such a forum dominates the 
representation of the other parties. An algorithm to determine the number of votes or 
seats allocated to each of the parties to ensure eqitable power sharing is also given. 
The causal reasons for internal conflict and the proposed methodology to deal 
with such conflict was presented to prominent South African politicians and political 
scientists for comment. A favourable response regarding their acceptance of the 
methodology was elucidated. 
Introduction 
During the last fifty years, more than two hundred wars were fought. Mishalli-
Ram (2006), for example, analysed 133 ethnic-related conflicts over the period 1918 
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to 2002 worldwide. Almost all of these were tantamount to civil war, that is, wars 
fought within a single country amongst its inhabitants. Civil wars take on a dynamic 
of their own which is distinct from interstate wars which are governed mainly by 
International Law. Civil wars are brutal affairs where anger, emotion and bitterness 
are exacerbated by the fact that family members, fomer colleagues and neighbours 
fight on opposite sides. Such wars cause physical destruction, set development back 
by decades or more and poison interrelationships in the community where they are 
being fought. 
The resulting air of distrust that develops makes the achievement of peace even 
more difficult. To resolve civil war, the warring parties frequently seek the 
involvement of international interveners whom all the warring parties trust to some 
acceptable degree to act as facilitators in order to find solutions that may lead to 
peace. The main concern of the warring parties is that hey will have a say in 
defining the peace they seek and realise their objectives for embarking on civil war 
to a degree that is acceptable to them. 
The international interveners must therefore find a way to allow all the parties 
meaningful participation in the peace negotiations. This article will seek to explain 
that an important underlying cause for political conflict and civil war is the fact that 
groupings in a country are denied a say in matters affecting themselves and that by 
allowing coalition forming, aggrieved groups may choose the bargaining chamber to 
civil war. The Shapley value is used to develop a mechanism for effective coalition 
forming. Finally, it is important that political scientists and politicians subscribe to 
the concept for it to be gainfully employed. To that end, the views of prominent 
South African political scientists and political leaders on the proposed coalition-
forming approach are reported. 
Causes of internal political conflict 
Internal conflict, and specifically its crystallisation in civil war, constitutes 
armed hostilities between groups within a country. The overarching motive for civil 
war is political by nature. From a realist perspectiv , albeit not at the international 
level, as proposed by Von Clausewitz ([1832] c1976), civil war could also be 
regarded as merely an extension of diplomacy at the national level. 
Contrasting perspectives 
Joseph Hanlon makes the case that most analysts accept that civil wars have 
multiple causes. However, there is no general agreement on specific roots and 
almost every claim to have identified a cause is disputed (Yanacopulos and Hanlon 





arcane and tend to be ignored by policy-makers. Mack (2002) further states that 




Figure 1: Contrasting perspectives about the causes of civil war 
Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006), however, provide a robust framework 
(depicted in Figure 1) to study the causes of civil war or internal conflict. To analyse 
the causes of internal conflict they propose a set of three contrasting perspectives 
which could be used, viz.  
• people under pressure versus big bad men; 
• internal versus external emphasis; and 
• historic versus recent events. 
The above three perspectives cannot be studied in isolation as they are mutually 
inclusive concepts. 
Because of its relative simplicity and the notion that it provides a workable 
explanation for most of the time, this framework was chosen to explain the causes of 
civil war and other internal political conflicts. However, it is acknowledged that a 





gain control of the state. Thus, the “small bad men” are evaluated as a force for 
political conflict only after they have become “big bad men”. 
People under pressure versus big bad men 
“Big bad men” are governments, leaders, presidents, dictators or institutional 
heads who act contrary to the interests of the people who become involved in 
internal conflict. Typically, they have sufficient power to make decisions and 
implement them without referring to the citizens they govern or affect. For example, 
a dictator with a secure power base may act without taking the interests of the 
country’s inhabitants into account. In turn, such unilateral actions pressurise the 
people which, in turn, results in adverse effects. This leads to grievances, economic 
hardship or environmental issues that cannot be readily resolved. 
People will react in different ways in order to address their grievances. They 
may seek coalitions with others in order to form majorities that have the power to 
address their problems. Failing that, they may become so frustrated that they turn to 
some form of aggression to vent their feelings or to address their grievances (Gurr 
175:75). This signifies the beginning of political onflict and civil war. The Nigerian 
Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, serves as an example. The war lasted 
from 6 July 1967 to 13 January 1970. It was a political conflict caused by the 
attempted secession of the south-eastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Biafra. An estimated 1,2 million casualties resulted with some 
animosities continuing to linger on to this day (Draper 1999). 
At Nigeria’s independence, a conservative political alliance was formed between 
the leading Hausa and Igbo political parties that were constituted along ethnic lines, 
which ruled Nigeria from 1960 to 1966. This alliance excluded the western Yoruba 
people. The well-educated Igbo people were considered by many to be the main 
beneficiaries of this alliance, taking most of the top jobs and leading business 
opportunities in the Nigerian federation. After the successful coup on 16 January 
1966 by Igbo Army officers, the status quo was largely maintained at the cost of the 
south-eastern provinces. Their exclusion from power made many fear that revenues 
from the newly discovered oil fields would be used to benefit areas in the north and 
west rather than their own. Pressure mounted and the Nigerian civil war became 
inevitable. 
It should be noted that the above brief explanation disregards the debate on fight, 
freeze and flee as underpinned by the theories of pychology (Vertzberger 1990) and 
rather concentrates on the “fight” element which may be regarded as extremist 





posture against big bad men, the inherent political conflict might never escalate to 
civil war. 
Internal versus external emphasis 
In some cases actions or decisions external to a particul r country may lead to 
political conflict within that country, whereas in other cases political conflict is 
caused by decisions or actions taken within the country in question. 
An example of external emphasis is the Mozambican Civil War that began in 
Mozambique following that country’s independence in 1975. The ruling party, 
Frelimo, was violently opposed from 1977 by the Rhodesian and later South 
African-funded opposition group known as Renamo. Over five million civilians 
were displaced, 900 000 are thought to have died in fighting and from starvation and 
many were made amputees by land mines, a legacy from the war that continues to 
plague Mozambique (Arnold 2005:711). 
An example of internal emphasis would be the struggle against apartheid in 
South Africa. The South African government elected in 1948 decided on a course of 
action of domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups in 
order to safeguard their constituents’ political power (Scott et al. 1975). Thus the 
seeds for this potential civil war had an internal emphasis. 
Historic versus recent events 
Causes for civil war sometimes originate in historic events whilst at other times 
they are initiated by recent or even current events. 
The Anglo-Norman mercenaries who went to Ireland uner Richard de Clare, 
Second Earl of Pembroke, nicknamed Strongbow, in 1169 marked the beginning of 
more than 800 years of direct English involvement in Ireland. The English crown 
did not begin asserting full control of the island until after the English Reformation, 
when questions over the loyalty of Irish vassals provided the initial impetus for a 
series of military campaigns between 1534 and 1691. This period was also marked 
by an official English policy of plantation which led to the arrival of thousands of 
English and Scottish Protestant settlers in Ireland. 
From this period on, sectarian conflict became a recurr nt theme in Irish history 
(Annaidh 1999). To understand the causal relationships of the problems in Ireland, a 
study of historic events over the last eight centuries that may have influenced Irish 
history is necessary. Depending on a chosen time line, the troubles in Ireland in, for 
example, 1540 could be viewed as the result of recent events, whilst the troubles in 





A juxtaposition of contrasting perspectives 
Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006) argue that the three contrasting perspectives 
(cited earlier in the text) are in essence caricatures and simplifications of real 
situations. However, by juxtaposing all three perspctives, insight into the causes of 
civil war might be found.  
Consider the genocide in Rwanda. The Rwandan Genocide was the mass 
extermination of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutu 
sympathisers in the period 6 April to mid-July 1994. It was the largest atrocity 
during the Rwandan civil war. The genocide was by and l rge carried out by two 
extremist Hutu militia groups, the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi. At least 
500 000 Tutsis and thousands of moderate Hutus died in the genocide (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999). In a historical context, Rwanda’s colonial masters, being 
Germany and Belgium in succession, favoured the Tutsi minority group and 
promoted their interests at the expense of the majority Hutus. In turn, this lead to 
mounting pressure in the Hutu population to rectify their perceived inferior position. 
Thus, big bad men, external to the country and some ti  ago, inadvertently 
caused a series of events to lead Rwanda to civil war and genocide. At the root of 
the genocide was the initial Hutu perception that tey were unable to influence day-
to-day events that impacted adversely on them.  
Major contributing causes to internal political conflict 
A careful analysis of numerous civil wars within the framework of the three 
contrasting perspectives leads to the following observations: 
• Big bad men, however well intentioned, at some time in the history of the 
country concerned cause grievances in particular segments of the 
population. 
• As long as they are hopeful of resolving their grievances, groups will 
attempt all avenues to better the situation. 
• When groups, whether in the minority or not, cannot resolve their 
grievances, they may choose violence such as coups, civil war or 
revolution as a mechanism to address such grievances. 
Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006) comment that richer countries with more 
established democracies have fewer civil wars. Studies suggest that even for 
relatively poor countries, strong democracy provides protection against civil war. 
They ascribe this observation to individual and group rights being respected and the 





grievances to be dealt with adequately. In other words, established democracies tend 
to allow avenues for minorities to address their grievances. 
In conclusion, as long as aggrieved parties are not all wed to address their 
grievances adequately, political conflict will emerg  and, if not addressed timely, 
such conflict may lead to civil war. Not only should governments and other leaders 
heed this fact in averting political conflict, but during the seeking of peace by all 
concerned, international interveners should also keep this in mind. 
Coalition forming as a conflict-resolution mechanism 
Suppose that in some country a conflict or dispute arises between n parties and 
that the i th party has support from a proportion, ip , of the population. If a 
proportional voting system is being used to resolve their differences or grievances 
and the jth party’s support is 0.5jp > , then that party’s policy will prevail. 
Should a system of consensus be adopted and one or more parties not agree to a 
particular resolution, a stalemate will occur. Should no party have outright majority 
support from the population, all the parties may seek coalitions with other parties to 
further their own agendas or policies. As a result, minorities might be able to 
influence decision outcomes to some degree and this, in turn, may lead to more 
lasting buy-in into resolutions made by the group. If the idea of coalition forming 
could be extended to allow it under all circumstances and to the degree that is 
commensurate with the political support of all parties, it may enhance lasting 
conflict-resolution decisions. Game theory may provide for such a course of action. 
Game theory 
Game theory has its origins in the ability of man to model his environment. 
However, game theory is a relatively new scientific development. The first 
comprehensive work in this regard was the book Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour by John von Neumann and O. Morgenster. This landmark book was first 
published in 1928 by the Princeton University Press. The book sparked off a flurry 
of academic activity and game theory soon became a popular modelling method. 
Straffin (1993) defines game theory as the logical analysis of situations of 
conflict and co-operation. The simplest type of game is a one-person game, also 
called a game against nature. A one-person game is a game in which a single player 
makes a decision in the face of an environment assumed to be indifferent or neutral. 
A two-person game is a game where two players make decisions and where the 
outcome of their decisions is interactively influenc d by both sets of decisions. Two-





the student of game theory. Games that involve more than two players are called n -
person games. 
In a finite game, each player has a finite number of strategies and a game could 
be presented by the matrix A , with each of its entries consisting of a list contai ing 
the n players’ payoffs. Consider a two-person game: Th  two players are referred to 
as the “row player” and the “column player” respectively and there will be two 
payoffs in every entry of the matrix. For example, in the entry ija , the first payoff in 
the entry is associated with the row player for playing his or her ith strategy, and the 
second payoff in the entry is associated with the column player for playing his or her 
jth strategy. In game theory, payoffs are normally determined by the utility of the 









serves as an example of a two-person game where both players have two strategies 
to choose from. Also, by inspection, it is noted that both players should consistently 
choose their second strategies to optimise their payoffs. Various methods to 
determine optimal strategies for all players exist. For the reader not familiar with 
game theory, a very good introduction is the book by Owen (1995). His notation is 
followed in the remainder of this article. 
To date, it appears that no theorem has been given for -person games. This 
has led many mathematicians to look for other solution concepts. One 
mathematician, Shapley (1953), published another solution concept for n -person 
games that became known as the Shapley value. 
Shapley value 
The Shapley value is a power index that is used to de ermine the extent of power 
that all players in an n -person game have when coalition forming takes place. A 
coalition for n -person games is defined as follows: If 
{ }1,2, ,N n= K  
is the set of all players, then any non-empty subset of N , including N  itself and 
all the one-element subsets, is called a coalition (Owen 1995:213). Furthermore, 





collective rationality, the n -tuple of payments to the players is called an 
imputation. The n -tuple of payments to the players is also known as the Shapley 
value of the game. A carrier for a game v  is a coalition T  such that for any set of 
players, S , the Shapley value would be 
( ) ( )v S v S T= I . 
A dummy player is any player who does not belong to a carrier, that is, such a 
player contributes nothing to a coalition. It follows that a dummy player, if left out 
of a coalition, will not influence the success or failure of that coalition. Let v  be an 
n -person game and let π  be any permutation of the set N , then, by vπ  is 
meant the game u  such that for any { }1, , sS i i= K  it holds that 
( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )1 , , su i i v Sπ π =K  
where the utility function u  comprises the utilities associated with the s
permutations ( )iiπ  regarding the ith carrier, and the game vπ  is effectively 
nothing other than the game v  with the roles of the players interchanged by the 
permutation π . Therefore, by the value of the game v  is meant the imputation 
[ ]vϕ  that must satisfy the following three axioms: 
Axiom 1: If S is any carrier of v, then 
[ ] ( )
S
v v Sϕ =∑ . 
Axiom 2: For any permutation π   andi N∈ , it is true that 
( ) [ ] [ ]ii v vπϕ π ϕ= . 
Axiom 3: If u  is any game, then 
[ ] [ ] [ ]i i iu v u vϕ ϕ ϕ+ = + . 
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 = − −   ∑  
(1) 
where 
• t  is the number of entities in a winning coalition that the ith player is part 
of, and 
• the ith player is not a dummy player, and 
• ( ) { }( ) 0v T v T i− − = if no player contributes anything, and 
• ( ) { }( ) 1v T v T i− − =  if the sum of the contributions is larger than 
( )v T . 
Consider a country with four political parties, 1, 2, 3 and 4 that have 10%, 20%, 
30% and 40% of the vote respectively. Decisions are made by simple majority vote. 
This situation represents a four-person game in which the winning coalitions are 
{2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4}. 
From the discussion, note that[ ] [ ]1 2 3 4, , ,vϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= . In order to find the 
power index value associated with political party 1, 1ϕ , it is determined that the 
only winning coalition T  such that { }1T i−  is not a winning coalition, is the 
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(2) 
Note that for all other coalitions, ( ) { }( )v T v T i − −   in equation 1 
evaluates to zero and hence equation 2 is sufficient. 
In order to find 2ϕ , it is noted that the coalitions {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3} and {2, 3, 4} 
numbered 1,2,3J =  respectively are the only winning coalitions which will not 
win if player 2 is removed from them and then 
























The values 3ϕ  and 4ϕ  are found similarly and the Shapley value for thisgame 
is the imputation ( )51 1 112 4 4 12, , ,ϕ = . 
The inverse of the Shapley value 
By the inverse of the Shapley value is meant the input values that would result in 





From the discussion at the beginning of this section, by finding the inverse to the 
Shapley value seats or voting stock in a decision-making body could be assigned 
such that ϕ  reflects the power base of the various parties. For the example above 
on a country with four parties, voting stock should be assigned to ensure 
 = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}ϕ . 
Dragan (2005) proposed a dynamic algorithm for finding semi- or weighted 
values for transferable utility games. This allows, inter alia, for the finding of the 
inverse function of the Shapley value. However, numerical methods may prove to be 
more readily implementable and will yield acceptable accuracy. A numerical method 
to find the inverse of the Shapley value will be described directly and the validity of 
the previous statement will then be revisited. 
Shapley value behaviour 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Shapley value behaves in a non-continuous 
manner. This is due to the fact that the elements of ϕ  are multiples of !1n . 
Moreover, in the trivial case where only one player participates in the game, 
1=ϕ . When two players participate in a game, { }0,1=ϕ  when the first player 
has more voting stock than the second player, { }1,0=ϕ  when the second player 
has more voting stock than the first player and { }2121 ,=ϕ  when the two players 
have exactly the same voting stock. 
In the latter case, it is noted that not only are th  elements of ϕ  multiples of 
!2
1 but changes in ϕ  are also of that order. Consider equation 2. Should voting 
stock of approximately 10.01%, 19.89%, 30.03% and 40.05% be allocated to the 
four players and it is varied from that position to v ting stock of approximately 
































In the above discussion, it was shown that the Shapley value elements – 
• may assume specific values only at particular voting stock situations such 
as a 50% stock for both players in the two-player sc nario, and 
• may assume specific values over a range of voting sock scenarios such as 
depicted in equation 3, 
• whilst changing these values at multiples of !
1
n  at the changing points, and 
• finally, it is implicit in the Shapley value that for n  small the changes in 
the elements of ϕ  relating to changes in voting stock are more 
pronounced than for n  large. 
Search algorithm 
The authors propose a numerical search algorithm for finding the required 
voting stock or inverse Shapley value for a given Shapely value as shown in Figure 
2 where 
• n  denotes the number of players in the game, 
• σ  denotes the search step length, 
• ϕ  denotes the required Shapley value, 
• ρ  denotes the imputation that must hold the algorithm’s start position 
and the found inverse Shapley value, 
• *ϕ denotes the computed Shapley value by using ρ  as the input or 
voting stock, 









iiF ϕϕ  
whilst 
*F denotes the figure of merit for the previous iteration, and 
• the Dummy variable is a Boolean value that evaluates YES if there are 
dummy players present in 






















Figure 2: Algorithm for finding inverse Shapley values 
The algorithm finds the inverse Shapley value by searching from a given start 
position held by ρ  and seeking a better solution by finding the element in ρ  that 
is furthest away from its corresponding element in 
*ϕ and then moves that element 
of ρ  by a fixed step length σ  in the required direction. On completion, ρ  is 





















This always occurs when ρϕ =  with nρρρ === K21 and as a result, 
ϕϕ =* . Moreover, it could readily be shown that it might also occur in some 
instances when nρρρ ≠≠≠ K21 . 
The second stop rule is more complex as it requires that no dummy players are 
present in the solution and that the figure of merit from the previous iteration, 
*F , 
is smaller than the figure of merit for the current iteration, F . Should a dummy 
player be present in the solution, the algorithm will disregard the status of 
*F  and 
F , and will carry out further iterations until no dummy players are present. Only 
then will the algorithm take the status of 
*F  and F  into account. 
 
Note that the found inverse Shapley value, ρ , is reported when the stop rule 
terminates the algorithm and only the value of ρ at the last iteration is reported. 
However, if ρ  is reported at every iteration, the set of values that *ϕ  may contain 
whilst 
*ϕ  remains constant may be found with accuracy σδ ≤ . It follows that for 
required accuracy, σδ ,  must be chosen such that δσ ≤ . Note that if the setting 
δσ =  is applied, the normalisation of ρ  will have the effect of reducing σ  and 





Applying the algorithm 
Consider the 2004 general elections in South Africa. The results for the eight 
parties with most significant voter support are given in Table 1 (Greben 2007). 
Table 1: Election results: South Africa 2004 
 
Supposing that the eight parties reflected in Table 1 are the only parties in 
parliament, seats in the house will be allocated according to the ratio 
 . ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,{0. 009}001600170017002300710127076=ρ  
(4) 
whereas the Shapley value associated with equation 4 is 
  , , , , , , {1,* 0}000000=ϕ  
(5) 
with 103404.0=F . 
From equation 5 it is clear that all power resides with the African National 
Congress (ANC). Now, suppose the ANC wishes to form a government of national 
unity with all eight parties, and to achieve this, they are willing to sacrifice some of 
their power provided that the power sharing model allows for power by coalition 
forming to the extent that it reflects as closely as possible the election results. 
By using the given algorithm for finding inverse Shapley values, it is found that 
by setting 
 . ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,{0. 0173}00307003260032600442013460238404691=ρ
(6) 
the power distribution in the proposed government of ational unity would be 
 






with 011045= 0. F . 
It is of interest that, in this particular case, 04170. 01=F  is the minimum 
for 
 . ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,{0. 0172}00307003260032600441013440238104698=ρ
 
and its associated imputation 
  ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,. ,{0. * 0}0476004760047600476004760047607142=ϕ
 
Although F is minimum, that is, the imputation 
*ϕ  is closest to the required 
imputation ϕ , because of the fact that *ϕ  includes a dummy player, the 
requirement for an all-inclusive situation is not met and by further iterations of the 
algorithm, a position where no dummy players are present and with F  as small as 
possible is found. 
At this point, the ANC’s power allocation reflects closely their results in the 
general election, whereas the Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), Independent Democrats (ID) and New 
National Party (NNP) may form winning coalitions for approximately 6% of the 
time and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and Freedom Front Plus 
(VF+) may form winning coalitions for approximately 1% of the time. Although the 
latter amounts may seem small, it is a far better si uation for these parties to be in 
than that of being a dummy player only. 
On the other hand, for the ANC this could become problematic as the seven 
other parties may consistently form a coalition with about 53% of the seats in 
parliament. In a mature democracy, the probability of the opposition acting in such a 
manner should be very low, but should it occur, this would be the price to the ruling 
party for realising a dream of a rainbow nation with a government of national unity 
as advocated by some. 
Proposed model for conflict resolution 
One view of consensus decision-making defines the process as a decision-
making process that not only seeks the agreement of most participants, but also to 





decision. Consensus is usually defined as meaning both general agreement, and the 
process of getting to such agreement. Consensus deciion-making is thus concerned 
primarily with that process (Bounds et al. 1995:538). 
Consider the situation where a country is in the midst of a civil war. After some 
time has elapsed, the various warring parties are tired of the war and are willing to 
commence talks about talks. During these preliminary t lks, and bearing in mind the 
observation that, if the grievances of parties are not addressed adequately and 
timely, political conflict and eventually civil war could emerge, which could be 
considered as the root of the conflict, a consensus m t be found to ensure the 
meaningful participation of all parties in the final solution to the conflict. 
The problem is that the proportion of delegates may not reflect the true support 
base of the various warring parties. Therefore, it is necessary for the warring parties 
to agree on the size of their respective support bases. But one of the parties may, 
because of its perceived or previously agreed support, warrant more than 50% of the 
delegates and in this case, the other parties become du my players with no power. 
The idea is that the number of delegates for every pa ty must be chosen so that 
the parties must work together to derive an equitable solution, that is, the parties 
must be able to form meaningful coalitions for a proportion of the decision events 
that reflects their respective support bases. This may result in the various factions 
being more responsive to the idea of talking about talks and set the scene for derived 
solutions at the peace talks to be acceptable to all f the warring parties. The 
allocation of delegates so derived should allow for formal consensus to take place 
more readily than in cases where a particular party’s epresentation in such a forum 
dominates the representation of the other parties. 
The scenario that was sketched assumes that a stalema e has occurred, the civil 
war was based on extremist politics and not on radical militarism, and the status quo 
is no longer acceptable to the involved parties. In tur , this leads to the assumption 
that all parties in the negotiation will be willing to relinquish some of their original 
goals and that none of them will exercise absolute r l . Such a situation, if not 
accepted by the warring parties, results in a conflict without a victor and a loser. 
This, in itself, may be the basis for a later conflict. One or more parties may be able 
to regroup, re-supply its forces and commence hostilities. On the other hand, a clear 
victor and a clear loser also will not guarantee a lasting peace. For example, it is 
often argued that the seeds of the Second World War were inherent to the Treaty of 






Political views on the proposed model 
For the proposed model to be accepted by governments a d international 
interveners as a useful tool in political conflict resolution, the causes for internal 
political conflict (described earlier in the discussion) and the proposed coalition-
forming mechanism should be regarded by them to be at least adequate. 
To that end, various prominent South African politicians and political scientists 
were asked to express their views regarding the ideas proposed in this article. At 
least one senior politician in each of the South African political parties represented 
in parliament and at least one senior political scientist at South African universities 
and other research institutions were approached. Five politicians and seven scientists 
responded. In terms of the South African Market Research Association Code of 
Conduct that regulates market research in South Africa, their names and affiliations 
will not be reported on. 
The views obtained from the politicians and political scientists are reported 
under the following headings: 
• Causes for political conflict, and 
• Coalition forming as a conflict-resolution mechanism. 
Causes for internal political conflict 
The respondents were asked to rate the validity of the seven causes of internal 
political conflict as proposed by Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006). The survey results 
indicated that there is a general consensus that the framework is a requisite 
exposition of the causes underlying internal political conflict. Given these causes, 
the respondents were then asked to rank them in order f importance. The results are 
reported in Table 2. Note that the respondents did not complete the rankings fully in 
all cases. 






The survey revealed that a juxtaposition of the above-mentioned causes was 
adjudged the most important cause of conflict amongst all respondents. However, 
amongst political scientists, big bad men, internal emphasis and recent events were 
also most prominent. The causes – people under pressure, big bad men, internal 
emphasis, historic and recent events – were all of importance. In general, the 
external emphasis was adjudged to be of least significa ce by both politicians and 
political scientists in near equal ratios. These results, coupled to some open-ended 
comments, demonstrated the willingness to accept the ideas about the causes for 
political conflict, described previously, by the participants. 
Coalition forming as a conflict-resolution mechanism 
Regarding conflict-resolution mechanisms, the respondents were asked to rate 
given mechanisms on a five-point Likert-type scale that was mapped in the interval 
[0, 100]. The overall results are shown in Figure 3.  
The results support the view held by Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006) that 
countries with more established democracies have few r civil wars. However, as few 
countries in the world have established democracies, thi  mechanism may have a 
reduced impact on political conflict resolution. Coalition forming as previously 
described is viewed by the respondents to be a strong contender as a conflict-
resolution mechanism. It can also be argued that by using a coalition-forming 
mechanism, people will have a more substantial say in their future and in turn, this 
may lead to hope being generated amongst them regardin  solving their grievances 
in a relatively peaceful manner. 
 
 






The causes underlying political conflict and its manifestation in civil war mainly 
comprises a juxtaposition of three contrasting persctives, viz. people under 
pressure versus big bad men; an internal versus an external emphasis, and historic 
versus recent events. Although established democracies have fewer civil wars, such 
democracies might fail or in the absence of established democracy, political conflict 
may cause civil war. In resolving civil war, a coalition-forming mechanism may 
prove valuable. 
The warring parties will have a say in the peace they seek and, in turn, hope for 
the future will be fostered. The use of the inverse Shapley value as proposed in this 
article is one way of implementing a coalition-forming mechanism where the 
warring parties will have a say in the peace they sek to an extent that is 
commensurate with their respective power bases. 
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